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Abstract
Hybrid logics are a principled generalization of both modal logics and description logics, a stan-
dard formalism for knowledge representation. In this paper we give the first constructive version of
hybrid logic, thereby showing that it is possible to hybridize constructive modal logics. Alternative
systems are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated version of intuitionistic hybrid
logic and prove essential proof-theoretical results for a natural deduction formulation of it. Our nat-
ural deduction system is also extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on
the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction
systems in a uniform way for a wide class of constructive hybrid logics. This shows that constructive
hybrid logics are a viable enterprise and opens up the way for future applications.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Classical hybrid logic is obtained by adding to ordinary classical modal logic further
expressive power in the form of a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals,
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: torben@ruc.dk (T. Braüner), Valeria.dePaiva@parc.com (V. de Paiva).
1 Partially funded by the Danish Natural Science Research Council (the HyLoMOL project). Also partially
funded by The IT University of Copenhagen.
2 Partially funded by the Advanced Research and Development Activity NIMD Program (MDA904-03-C-
0404).1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2005.06.009
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at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. Thus, in hybrid
logic a name is a particular sort of propositional symbol whereas in first-order logic it is
an argument to a predicate. If a is a nominal and A is an arbitrary formula, then a new
formula a : A called a satisfaction statement can be formed. The part a : of a : A is called a
satisfaction operator. The satisfaction statement a : A expresses that the formula A is true
at one particular world, namely the world at which the nominal a is true.
The present paper concerns constructive hybrid logics, that is, hybrid logics where the
classical logic basis has been replaced by a constructive logic basis. A question we can ask
is of course why should one worry about constructive hybrid logics.
A first, philosophical answer might be that since we “believe” in constructive logics as
well as in hybrid logics, we would like to combine them in one logical system.
A second, more mathematical answer may be simply that we should be able to define
“constructive hybrid logics” since we presume that the main concerns of hybrid logic are
orthogonal to whether the underline logic is constructive or not. We note that this supposi-
tion of orthogonality is justified by a distinction between the way of reasoning and what the
reasoning is about. If we do define basic constructive hybrid logics and prove for them the
kinds of results that we usually prove for constructive logics (normalization, subformula
property, cut-elimination), we learn more about extant hybrid logics and we provide more
evidence that hybrid logics are important in their own right.3
A third, pragmatic answer, or perhaps one geared to applications, is that if one needs
to construct a logic of contexts with certain characteristics, perhaps a constructive basic
hybrid logic might be the right foundation for this kind of application. The basic intu-
ition here is that the satisfaction operators of hybrid logic might be just the syntactic tool
required to construct logics that pay attention to contexts with certain desirable features.
This hypothesis can only be checked, once we have defined and investigated one or more
basic constructive hybrid logics, at least to some extent. Moreover, we reckon that a modal
type theory based on hybrid logic could prove itself useful,4 as other constructive modal
type theories and as other classical hybrid logics have already proven themselves.
Of course, even if the supposition above, of orthogonality between hybridness and con-
structivity is valid, we still do not know exactly how to define constructive hybrid logics.
We do not have a recipe for defining constructive hybrid logics: Several open possibilities
are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated natural deduction system and
prove some essential proof-theoretical results for it. Moreover, we show how to extend
the system with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the
accessibility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric
theories. Different geometric theories give rise to different constructive hybrid logics, so
natural deduction systems for new constructive hybrid logics can be obtained in a uniform
way simply by adding inference rules as appropriate.
3 This would also provide evidence that these proof-theoretical properties are worth investigating for any logical
system. But justifying proof-theory is not the issue here.
4 Actually a constructive modal type theory, based on a constructive and hybrid logical version of S5, has
independently of the present work been proposed by Jia and Walker [11] in 2004.
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languages for talking about relational structures, that is, models in the sense of model-
theory. Thus, modal logics are alternatives to (classical) first-order logics. This view is
well justified, but we believe that proof-theory adds another important perspective to
modal logics, emphasizing the notion of proof and the fundamental differences between
various formal systems for representing proofs, see [14]. The perspective of this paper
is proof-theoretic, so we shall focus on formal proof systems for constructive hybrid
logic.
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section of the paper we make some
preliminary considerations, in the third section we give a Kripke semantics, and in the
fourth section we introduce a natural deduction system, and moreover, we prove a nor-
malization theorem. The natural deduction system is an intuitionistic version of a natural
deduction system for classical hybrid logic originally given in the paper [5]. In the fifth sec-
tion we prove soundness and completeness with respect to Kripke semantics. In the final
section we draw some conclusions and discuss future work. This paper is an extended ver-
sion of [7]. While the previous version only discussed pure hybrid systems, the extended
version here discusses additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on
the accessibility relations.
2. Preliminaries
Having decided to investigate constructive hybrid logics, we must describe, what their
main components are. We start with a short description of constructive modal logic. This
is followed by another short description of what constitutes classical hybrid logic. Finally
we describe ways of putting these components together.
2.1. Constructive modal logic
‘Constructive’ is an umbrella term for logics that worry about deciding which disjunct
is true and/or about providing witnesses for existential statements. Here we mean, much
more restrictively, that we take our basis to be intuitionistic logic, henceforth IL for the
propositional fragment and IFOL for intuitionistic first-order logic.
While the syntax (in axiomatic form) and the semantics (in usual Kripke style) of tra-
ditional, classical modal logics are relatively well-known, it is fair to say that even axioms
for constructive modal logics, but especially natural deduction formalizations for these are
subject to much debate.
We start by describing which basic axioms we require for a minimal K constructive
modal logic. First we define our formulas. Given a basic set of propositional symbols
ranged over by the metavariables p,q, r, . . . , the well-formed formulas of our constructive
modal logic are built by conjunction, disjunction, and implication, together with falsum and
the necessity and possibility modalities. Thus, the formulas are defined by the grammar
S ::= p | S ∧ S | S ∨ S | S → S | ⊥ |S | ♦S
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over formulas. Negation, as usual in constructive logic, is defined by the convention that
¬A is an abbreviation for A → ⊥. Also, the nullary conjunction  is an abbreviation for
¬⊥ and the bi-implication A ↔ B is an abbreviation for (A → B)∧ (B → A).
Axioms for this system consist of any basic axiomatization of intuitionistic proposi-
tional logic (IL) together with Simpson’s axioms for the modalities. These are:
(taut) 	 A for all intuitionistic tautologies A
(K) 	(A → B) → (A →B)
(♦1) 	(A → B) → (♦A → ♦B)
(♦2) 	 (♦A →B) →(A → B)
(dist0) 	 ¬♦⊥
(dist1) 	 ♦(A∨B) → (♦A∨♦B)
together with the proof rules of Necessitation (Nec) and Modus Ponens (MP)
(Nec)
	 A
	A
(MP)
	 A → B 	 A
	 B
We start by defining the possible-worlds semantics for the intuitionistic modal logic that
we shall be using. We remark that this notion of a model for intuitionistic modal logic was
originally introduced in a tense-logical version by Ewald in [8] and it has also been used
by Simpson in [17, p. 88].
Definition 1. A model for basic intuitionistic modal logic is a tuple
M= (W,, {Dw}w∈W, {Rw}w∈W, {Vw}w∈W )
where
1. W is a non-empty set partially ordered by ;
2. for each w, Dw is a non-empty set such that w  v implies Dw ⊆ Dv ;
3. for each w, Rw is a binary relation on Dw such that w  v implies Rw ⊆ Rv ; and
4. for each w, Vw is a function that to each propositional symbol p assigns a subset of
Dw such that w  v implies Vw(p) ⊆ Vv(p).
Given a modelM as defined above, the relationM,w,d |= A is defined by induction,
where w is an element of W , d is an element of Dw , and A is a formula.
M,w,d |= p iff d ∈ Vw(p)
M,w,d |= A∧B iff M,w,d |= A andM,w,d |= B
M,w,d |= A∨B iff M,w,d |= A orM,w,d |= B
M,w,d |= A → B iff for all v w,M, v, d |= A impliesM, v, d |= B
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M,w,d |=A iff for all v w, for all e ∈ Dv,dRve impliesM, v, e |= A
M,w,d |= ♦A iff for some e ∈ Dw,dRwe andM,w, e |= A
This notion of model is very much a notion of a model of intuitionistic quantificational
logic used simply for propositional modal logic. The introduction of D’s might look an
excessive complication.
Simpson’s natural deduction system consists of labelled versions of the usual rules for
the propositional connectives plus the following rules for the modalities:
y : A xRy
(♦I )
x : ♦A x : ♦A
[y : A][xRy]···
z : B
(♦E)
z : B
[xRy]···
y : A
(I )
x :A
x :A xRy
(E)
y : A
The rules (♦E) and (I ) are equipped with appropriate side-conditions in connection
with the label y, that is, y does not occur in x : ♦A, in z : B , or in any undischarged
assumptions other than the specified occurrences of y : A and xRy. Moreover, y does not
occur in x :A or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences
of xRy. Simpson’s natural deduction system is different from, say natural deduction in
Prawitz’s book, in two aspects: First it has all of its formulas labelled; they have the form
x : A where x is a label, that is, a variable, and A is a formula. Intuitively, the variable x
denotes a world in a modal model and the metalinguistic expression x : A is to be read as
‘formula A holds at world x’. Secondly, Simpson’s system has relational premises on the
form xRy, and similarly, relational assumptions. The metalinguistic expression xRy is to
be read as ‘world x sees world y’.
There are several versions of natural deduction systems for (mostly classical) modal
logics of this form in the literature [1,9,12,16]. Their basic idea is always to give introduc-
tion and elimination rules for necessity () and possibility (♦) which capture their possible
worlds interpretation.5 Recall that Simpson’s particular version of natural deduction pre-
sentation satisfies normalization, as well as being “extendable” to a large collection of
other logics given by so-called geometric theories. Hence, this system is proof-theoretically
well-behaved, at least as far as the criteria of normalization and subformula property are
concerned. A philosophical objection to this kind of system is that it builds-in the (desired)
semantics into the given syntax, but the trade-off is that this way one obtains a uniform
framework for a large class of modal logics.
5 But the systems themselves and their models vary widely.
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Hybrid logics are extensions of modal logics where to the usual stock of syntactic and
semantic structures, we add a new kind of propositional symbols, the so-called nominals,
which reference individual possible worlds, that is, a nominal is true at exactly one world.
It is assumed that a set of ordinary propositional symbols and a countably infinite set of
nominals are given. The sets are assumed to be disjoint. The metavariables p, q , r, . . . range
over ordinary propositional symbols and a, b, c, . . . range over nominals. We also add a
new kind of operators called the satisfaction operators. The formulas of hybrid modal logic
are defined by the grammar
S ::= p | a | S ∧ S | S ∨ S |→ S | ⊥ |S | ♦S | a : S
where p is an ordinary propositional symbol and a is a nominal. Formulas of the form
a : C are called satisfaction statements, cf. a similar notion in [3]. In this paper we will
define a system of intuitionistic hybrid logic, using the same formulas of classical hybrid
logic, which will be denoted by IHL.
There are many kinds of hybrid logics in the literature, one of the parameters being
which extra operators one considers. Here we restrict our attention to only satisfaction op-
erators, a system that in the classical case has been called HL(@) where @ is one notation
for satisfaction operators.
2.3. Which constructive hybrid logic?
Now there are at least two different approaches that one can take when trying to put
together constructivity, modality and hybridness of logic systems.
First, one might think that since hybrid logic is obtained from classical modal logic by
adding nominals and satisfaction operators, one should obtain constructive hybrid logic by
adding to constructive modal logic nominals and satisfaction operators. This is sensible,
and will be our approach to defining IHL, but of course it depends on the constructive
modal logic chosen. Our goal is to reason constructively within constructive modal logic
and we want to be able to “jump” to other modal worlds using some version of constructive
satisfaction operators and modalities.
Second, one might think of “hybridizing” intuitionistic logic to enhance the expres-
sive power of intuitionistic logic, considered as a language for talking about intuitionistic
Kripke structures. Choosing this option puts an excessive emphasis on Kripke semantics
as a guiding principle.
It is not clear whether these two lines of research will lead to different logical systems
or not. But one suspects that the results will be different. In particular, considering only
constructive modal logics, one of the reasons for the multiplicity of systems is whether one
believes that only the propositional basis of the logic should be constructive or whether
the modalities themselves should have a constructive component of their own. This can
be ascertained by asking whether adding, say the excluded middle axiom, gives you back
the classical modal system you first thought of, or not. Choosing Simpson’s axiom system
we’re choosing that the addition of the excluded middle gives you back the classical modal
logic system you started from, in our case modal K. Similarly, if the natural deduction
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natural deduction rule corresponding to the excluded middle (technically, we just modify
the rule for ⊥ as appropriate), then we will get back the classical hybrid logic of [5], that
is, the modal operator ♦ becomes definable in terms of  (♦ becomes equivalent to ¬¬)
and we also have that ∧ and ∨ become definable in terms of → and ⊥.
3. Kripke semantics
In this section we give the possible-worlds semantics for intuitionistic hybrid logic, IHL.
This semantics is an extension of a possible-worlds semantics for intuitionistic modal logic
which was originally introduced in a tense-logical version by Ewald [8].
The main intuition is that since we want to consider a constructive reading of hybrid
logic where a distinction is made between the way of reasoning and what the reasoning
is about, we need to separate the intuitionistic partial order from the interpretation of the
nominals as well as the binary relation corresponding to the two modal operators.
Definition 2. A model for intuitionistic hybrid logic is a tuple(
W,, {Dw}w∈W, {∼w}w∈W, {Rw}w∈W, {Vw}w∈W
)
, where
(1) W is a non-empty set partially ordered by ;
(2) for each w, Dw is a non-empty set such that w  v implies Dw ⊆ Dv ;
(3) for each w, ∼w is an equivalence relation on Dw such that w  v implies ∼w ⊆∼v ;
(4) for each w, Rw is a binary relation on Dw such that w  v implies Rw ⊆ Rv ; and
(5) for each w, Vw is a function that to each ordinary propositional symbol p assigns a
subset of Dw such that w  v implies Vw(p) ⊆ Vv(p).
It is assumed that if d ∼w d ′, e ∼w e′, and dRwe, then d ′Rwe′, and similarly, if d ∼w d ′
and d ∈ Vw(p), then d ′ ∈ Vw(p).
Intuitively, the elements of the set W are “states of knowledge” and for any such state
w, the set Dw is the set of possible worlds known in the state of knowledge w, the relation
∼w corresponds to the known identities between possible worlds, and the relation Rw is
the known relationship between possible worlds. Note that the definition requires that the
partial order  on the states of knowledge, which we call the “epistemic” partial order,
preserves knowledge, that is, if an advance to a greater state of knowledge is made, then
what is known is preserved.
Given a model M and an element w of W , a w-assignment is a function that to each
nominal assigns an element of Dw . The relationM, g,w,d |= A is defined by induction,
where w is an element of W , g is a w-assignment, d is an element of Dw , and A is a
formula.
M, g,w,d |= p iff d ∈ Vw(p)
M, g,w,d |= a iff d ∼w g(a)
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M, g,w,d |= A∨B iff M, g,w,d |= A orM, g,w,d |= B
M, g,w,d |= A → B iff for all v w,M, g, v, d |= A impliesM, g, v, d |= B
M, g,w,d |= ⊥ iff falsum
M, g,w,d |=A iff for all v w, for all e ∈ Dv,dRve impliesM, g, v, e |= A
M, g,w,d |= ♦A iff for some e ∈ Dw, dRwe andM, g,w, e |= A
M, g,w,d |= a : A iff M, g,w,g(a) |= A
By convention M, g,w |= A means M, g,w,d |= A for every element d of Dw and
M |= A meansM, g,w |= A for every element w of W and every w-assignment g. A for-
mula A is valid if and only if M |= A for every model M. Note the difference in the
interpretations of the two modal operators: The interpretation of the  operator involves
quantification over states of knowledge whereas the interpretation of ♦ does not. This is be-
cause the modal operators correspond to quantifiers in intuitionistic first-order logic where
the interpretation of the ∀ uses the accessibility relation whereas the interpretation of ∃
does not.
An example of a formula valid in classical hybrid logic but not valid in the constructive
semantics given here is a : b∨a : ¬b, where a : b is interpreted as the possible worlds g(a)
and g(b) being related by ∼w but a : ¬b is interpreted as g(a) and g(b) not being related
by ∼v for any v w. This formula corresponds to the formula a = b∨¬a = b in the first-
order correspondence language we introduce below. Since in intuitionistic first-order logic
we do not have a general excluded middle, a constructivist thinks that this formula should
only be valid, if the equality predicate for nominals is a decidable predicate. (Incidentally,
this formula would be valid if for any w, the relation ∼w is taken to be the identity on the
set Dw . Thus, the relation ∼w is needed.)
Another example is the formula a : A ↔ ¬a : ¬A. This formula should not be valid
constructively, but it should be valid classically and it is actually taken as an axiom for
classical hybrid logic by some authors.
The semantics satisfies the following important proposition.
Proposition 3 (Monotonicity). IfM, g,w,d |= A and w  v, thenM, g, v, d |= A.
Proof. Induction in the structure of A. 
A model for intuitionistic hybrid logic can be considered a model for intuitionistic first-
order logic with equality and conversely, a model for intuitionistic first-order logic with
equality can be considered a model for intuitionistic hybrid logic (see [17] for the simpler
correspondence between modal-logical models and intuitionistic first-order models with-
out equality and see also [18] which gives a definition of intuitionistic first-order models
with equality). The first-order language under consideration here has a 1-place predicate
symbol corresponding to each ordinary propositional symbol of modal logic, a 2-place
predicate symbol corresponding to the modalities, and a 2-place predicate symbol cor-
responding to equality. The language does not have constant or function symbols. It is
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a, b, c, . . . range over first-order variables. So the formulas of the first-order language we
consider are defined by the grammar
S ::= p(a) | R(a, b) | a = b | S ∧ S | S ∨ S | S → S | ⊥ | ∀aS | ∃aS
where p is an ordinary propositional symbol of hybrid logic, and a and b are first-order
variables. The connectives ¬, , and ↔ are defined as in intuitionistic hybrid logic.
Moreover, if nominals of hybrid logic are identified with first-order variables, then a w-
assignment in the sense of intuitionistic hybrid logic can be considered as a w-assignment
in the sense of intuitionistic first-order logic and vice versa.
Given a model M = (W,, {Dw}w∈W, {∼w}w∈W, {Rw}w∈W, {Vw}w∈W) for intuition-
istic hybrid logic, considered as a model for intuitionistic first-order logic, the relation
M,w |= A[g] is defined by induction, where w is an element of W , g is a w-assignment,
and A is a first-order formula.
M,w |= p(a)[g] iff g(a) ∈ Vw(p)
M,w |= a = b[g] iff g(a) ∼w g(b)
M,w |= R(a, b)[g] iff g(a)Rwg(b)
M,w |= A∧B[g] iff M,w |= A[g] andM,w |= B[g]
M,w |= A∨B[g] iff M,w |= A[g] orM,w |= B[g]
M,w |= A → B[g] iff for all v w,M, v |= A[g] impliesM, v |= B[g]
M,w |= ⊥[g] iff falsum
M,w |= ∀aA[g] iff for all v w, for all g′ a∼ g, g′(a) ∈ Dv implies
M, v |= A[g′]
M,w |= ∃aA[g] iff for some g′ a∼ g, g′(a) ∈ Dw andM,w |= A[g′]
By convention M |= A means M,w |= A[g] for every element w of W and every w-
assignment g. In Section 5 we shall make use of the first-order semantics above in connec-
tion with the interpretation of geometric theories.
4. The natural deduction system
In this section a natural deduction system for intuitionistic hybrid logic is given and it is
shown how to extend the system with additional rules corresponding to conditions on the
accessibility relations. Moreover, a normalization theorem is proved. The natural deduction
system is an intuitionistic version of a natural deduction system for classical hybrid logic
originally given in [5]. An axiomatic formulation for intuitionistic hybrid logic can be
found in the paper [4]. See the books [13] and [19] for the basics of natural deduction. See
also the book [10] for an introduction to natural deduction with a slant towards intuitionistic
logic.
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(∧I )
a : (A∧B)
a : (A∧B)
(∧E1)
a : A
a : (A∧B)
(∧E2)
a : B
a : A
(∨I1)
a : (A∨B)
a : B
(∨I2)
a : (A∨B) a : (A∨B)
[a : A]···
C
[a : B]···
C
(∨E)
C
[a : A]···
a : B
(→ I )
a : (A → B)
a : (A → B) a : A
(→ E)
a : B
a : ⊥
(⊥E)
C
a : A
(: I )
c : a : A
c : a : A
(: E)
a : A
e : A a : ♦e
(♦I )
a : ♦A a : ♦A
[c : A] [a : ♦c]···
C
(♦E)∗
C
[a : ♦c]···
c : A
(I )
a :A
a :A a : ♦e
(E)
e : A
∗ c does not occur in a : ♦A, in C, or in any undischarged assumptions other than
the specified occurrences of c : A and a : ♦c.
 c does not occur in a : A or in any undischarged assumptions other than the
specified occurrences of a : ♦c.
Fig. 1. Natural deduction rules for connectives.
(Ref )
a : a
a : c a : A
(Nom1)∗
c : A
a : c a : ♦b
(Nom2)
c : ♦b∗ A is a propositional symbol (ordinary or a nominal).
Fig. 2. Natural deduction rules for nominals.
We make use of the following conventions. The metavariables π , τ , . . . range over
derivations. The metavariables Γ , Δ, . . . range over sets of formulas. A derivation π is a
derivation of A if the end-formula of π is an occurrence of A and π is a derivation from
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numbers annotating undischarged assumptions are ignored). If there exists a derivation of
A from ∅, then we simply say that A is derivable. Moreover, B[c/a] is the formula B
where the nominal c has been substituted for all occurrences of the nominal a and π[c/a]
is the derivation π where each formula occurrence B has been replaced by B[c/a]. The
degree of a formula is the number of occurrences of non-nullary connectives in it.
Natural deduction inference rules for intuitionistic hybrid logic are given in Figs. 1
and 2. All formulas in the rules are satisfaction statements. Note that the modal rules for
our system are like Simpson’s modal rules, except that we replaced first-order relational
formulas like R(a, c) by the hybrid formula a :c, thereby internalizing the accessibility
relation. Note that this internalization process can be accomplished for hybrid logic, but
for modal logic, these relational formulas belong to the metalevel. The nominal natural
deduction rules are similar to the usual equality rules for first order logic. The system thus
obtained will be denoted NIHL.
4.1. Extensions to geometric theories
In what follows we shall consider natural deduction systems obtained by extending
NIHL with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessi-
bility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric theories.
A first-order formula is geometric if it is built out of atomic formulas of the form R(a, c)
and a = c using only the connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and ∃. In what follows, the metavariables
Sk and Sjk range over atomic formulas of the mentioned forms. Atomic formulas of the
mentioned forms can be translated into first-order hybrid logic in a truth preserving way as
follows.
HT
(
R(a, c)
)= a : ♦c
HT(a = c) = a : c
See [20] for an introduction to geometric logic.
Now, a geometric theory is a finite set of closed first-order formulas each having the
form ∀a¯(A → B) where the formulas A and B are geometric, a¯ is a list a1, . . . , al of first-
order variables, and ∀a¯ is an abbreviation for ∀a1 . . .∀al . It can be proved, cf. [17], that
any geometric theory is intuitionistically equivalent to a basic geometric theory which is a
s1 . . . sn
[s11] . . . [s1n1 ]···
C . . .
[sm1] . . . [smnm ]···
C
(RG)
∗
C∗ None of the nominals in c¯ occur in C or in any of the undischarged assumptions
other than the specified occurrences of sjk . (Recall that nominals are identified
with first-order variables and that c¯ are the first-order variables existentially quan-
tified over in the formula G.)
Fig. 3. Natural deduction rules for geometric theories.
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(∗)∀a¯
(
(S1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sn) → ∃c¯
m∨
j=1
(Sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sjnj )
)
where n,m  0 and n1, . . . , nm  1. For simplicity, we assume that the variables in the
list a¯ are pairwise distinct, that the variables in c¯ are pairwise distinct, and that no variable
occurs in both a¯ and c¯. Note that a formula of the form displayed above is a Horn clause if
c¯ is empty, m = 1, and nm = 1.
We now give hybrid natural deduction rules corresponding to a basic geometric theory.
The metavariables sk and sjk range over hybrid-logical formulas of the forms a : ♦c and
a : c. With a first-order formula G of the form (∗) displayed above, we associate the natural
deduction inference rule (RG) given in Fig. 3 where sk is of the form HT(Sk) and sjk is of
the form HT(Sjk). For example, if G is the formula
∀a∀c((R(a, c)∧R(c, a))→ a = c)
then (RG) is the natural deduction rule
a : ♦c c : ♦a
[a : c]···
C
(RG)
C
The formula, and hence the inference rule, corresponds to the accessibility relation R being
antisymmetric. Now, let T be any basic geometric theory. The natural deduction system
obtained by extending NIHL with the set of rules {(RG) | G ∈ T} will be denoted NIHL +
T. We shall assume that we are working with a fixed basic geometric theory T unless
otherwise specified.
It is straightforward to check that if a formula in a basic geometric theory is a Horn
clause, then the rule (RG) given in Fig. 3 can be replaced by the following simpler rule
(which we have also called (RG)).
s1 . . . sn
(RG)
s11
For example, if G is the formula corresponding to the accessibility relation being antisym-
metric, cf. above, then the following rule will do.
a : ♦c c : ♦a
(RG)
a : c
Natural deduction rules corresponding to Horn clauses were discussed already in [14].
4.2. An eliminable rule
Below we state a small proposition regarding an eliminable rule.
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a : c a : A
(Nom)
c : A
is eliminable.
Proof. A straightforward extension of a proof in [5]. 
Note in the proposition above that A can be any formula; not just a propositional
symbol. Thus, the rule (Nom) generalises (Nom1) (and the rule (Nom2) as well). The
side-condition on the rule (Nom1) enables us to prove a normalization theorem such that
normal derivations satisfy a version of the subformula property called the quasi-subformula
property. We shall return to this issue later.
4.3. Normalization
In what follows we give reduction rules for the natural deduction system and we prove
a normalization theorem. First some conventions. If a premise of a rule has the form a : c
or a : ♦c, then it is called a relational premise, and similarly, if the conclusion of a rule has
the form a : c or a : ♦c, then it is called a relational conclusion. Moreover, if an assumption
discharged by a rule has the form a : ♦c, then it is called a relationally discharged assump-
tion. The premise of the form a : A in the rule (→ E) is called minor and the premises of
the form C in the rules (∨E), (♦E), and (RG) are called parametric premises. A premise
of an elimination rule that is neither minor, relational, or parametric is called major.
A maximum formula in a derivation is a formula occurrence that is both the conclusion
of an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule. Maximum formulas
can be removed by applying proper reductions. The rules for proper reductions are as
follows. We have omitted the reduction rules involving the connectives ∧, →, : , and 
which can be found in [5].
(∨I1) followed by (∨E) (analogously in the case of (∨I2))
··· π1
a : A
a : (A∨B)
[a : A]··· π2
C
[a : B]··· π3
C
C

··· π1
a : A··· π2
C
(♦I ) followed by (♦E)
··· π1
e : A
··· π2
a : ♦e
a : ♦A
[c : A] [a : ♦c]··· π3
C
C

··· π1
e : A
··· π2
a : ♦e··· π3[e/c]
C
It turns out that we need further reduction rules in connection with the inference rules
(⊥E), (∨E), (♦E), and (RG). A permutable formula in a derivation is a formula occur-
rence that is both the conclusion of (⊥E), (∨E), (♦E), or (RG) and the major premise of
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mutative reductions. The rules for permutative reductions are as follows in the case where
the elimination rule has two premises. We have omitted the reduction rule where (RG) is
followed by an elimination which can be found in [5].
(⊥E) followed by a two-premise elimination
··· π1
a : ⊥
C
··· π
E
D

··· π1
a : ⊥
D
(∨E) followed by a two-premise elimination
··· π1
a : (A∨B)
[a : A]··· π2
C
[a : B]··· π3
C
C
··· π
E
D
 ··· π1
a : (A∨B)
[a : A]··· π2
C
··· π
E
D
[a : B]··· π3
C
··· π
E
D
D
(♦E) followed by a two-premise elimination
··· π1
a : ♦A
[c : A] [a : ♦c]··· π2
C
C
··· π
E
D
 ··· π1
a : ♦A
[b : A] [a : ♦b]··· π2[b/c]
C
··· π
E
D
D
The cases where the elimination rule has one or three premises are obtained by deleting or
adding derivations as appropriate.
A derivation is normal if it contains no maximum or permutable formula. In what
follows we shall prove a normalization theorem which says that any derivation can be
rewritten to a normal derivation by repeated applications of reductions. To this end we
need a number of definitions and lemmas.
Definition 5. The ♦-graph of a derivation π is the binary relation on the set of formula
occurrences in π of the form a : ♦c which is defined as follows. A pair of formula oc-
currences (A,B) is an element of the ♦-graph of π if and only if it satisfies one of the
following conditions.
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(2) A is the major premise of an instance of (♦E) at which B is relationally discharged.
(3) A is a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (RG) which has B as the
conclusion.
Note that the ♦-graph of π is a relation on the set of formula occurrences of π ; not the
set of formulas occurring in π . Also, note that every formula occurrence in a ♦-graph is of
the form a : ♦c.
Lemma 6. The ♦-graph of a derivation π does not contain cycles.
Proof. Induction on the structure of π . 
Definition 7. The potential of a chain in the ♦-graph of π is the number of formula occur-
rences in the chain which are major premises of instances of (♦E). A stubborn formula in
a derivation π is a maximum or permutable formula of the form a : ♦c and the stubborn-
ness of a stubborn formula in π is the maximal potential of a chain in the ♦-graph of π
that contains the stubborn formula.
Note that the notion of potential of a chain in the definition above is well-defined
since Lemma 6 implies that the number of formula occurrences of a chain in a ♦-graph
is bounded.
Lemma 8. Let π be a derivation where all stubborn maximum formulas have stubborn-
ness less than or equal to d and all stubborn permutable formulas have stubbornness less
than d . Assume that A is a stubborn maximum formula with stubbornness d such that no
formula occurrence above A is a stubborn maximum formula with stubbornness d . Let π ′
be the derivation obtained by applying the reduction such that A is removed.
Then all stubborn maximum formulas in π ′ have stubbornness less than or equal to d
and all stubborn permutable formulas in π ′ have stubbornness less than d , and moreover,
the number of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π ′ is less than the
number of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π .
Proof. The derivations π and π ′ have the forms below.
··· π1
e : d
··· π2
a : ♦e
a : ♦d
[c : d] [a : ♦c]··· π3
C
C··· τ
B
··· π1
e : d
··· π2
a : ♦e··· π3[e/c]
C··· τ
B
Note that any formula occurrence in π ′ except the indicated occurrences of e : d , a : ♦e,
and C in an obvious way can be mapped to a formula occurrence in π . Let f be the
map thus defined (note that f need not be injective as the instance of (♦E) in π might
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of π ′ to the ♦-graph of π is defined as follows. There are a number of cases to consider.
Case 1: An element (F,G) of the ♦-graph of π ′ where the formula occurrences F and G
both are in the domain of f is mapped to (f (F ),f (G)) which straightforwardly can be
shown to be an element of the ♦-graph of π (observe that no assumption in π1 or π2 is
discharged at a rule-instance in π3[e/c]). Case 2: An element (F,G) where G is one of
the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e (and F therefore is in the domain of f ) is mapped to
(f (F ),G′) where G′ is the relational premise of the instance of (♦I ). Case 3: An element
(F,G) where F is the indicated occurrence of C (and G therefore is in the domain of
f ) is mapped to (F ′, f (G)) where F ′ is the conclusion of the instance of (♦E). Case 4:
An element (F,G) where F is one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e, F is different
from the indicated occurrence of C, and G is in the domain of f is mapped to (F ′, f (G))
where F ′ is the assumption in π3 discharged by the instance of (♦E) corresponding to
the occurrence of a : ♦e in question. Case 5: An element (F,G) where G is the indicated
occurrence of C, G is different from each of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e, and F
is in the domain of f is mapped to (f (F ),G′) where G′ is the parametric premise of the
instance of (♦I ). Case 6: An element (F,G) where F is one of the indicated occurrences
of a : ♦e and G is the indicated occurrence of C is mapped to (F ′,G′) where F ′ is the
assumption in π3 discharged by the instance of (♦E) corresponding to the occurrence of
a : ♦e in question and G′ is the parametric premise of the instance of (♦E). By using the
map from the ♦-graph of π ′ to the ♦-graph of π , any chain in the ♦-graph of π ′ that does
not contain any of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e can in an obvious way be mapped to
a chain in the ♦-graph of π with the same potential which does not contain the indicated
occurrences of a : ♦e, a : ♦d , and a : ♦c, and similarly, any chain in the ♦-graph of π ′ that
contains one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e can in an obvious way be mapped to
a chain in the ♦-graph of π with greater potential which contain the mentioned formula
occurrences. The conclusions of the lemma follow straightforwardly. 
Definition 9. A segment in a derivation π is a non-empty list A1, . . . ,An of formula oc-
currences in π with the following properties.
(1) A1 is not the conclusion of an instance of (∨E), an instance of (♦E), or an instance
of (RG) with more than zero parametric premises.
(2) For each i < n, Ai is a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (RG)
which has Ai+1 as the conclusion.
(3) An is not a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (RG).
The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences in the segment. A segment
σ1 stands above a segment σ2 if and only if the last formula occurrence in σ1 stands above
the first formula occurrence in σ2. A maximum segment (permutable segment) is a segment
in which the last formula occurrence is a maximum formula (permutable formula). A stub-
born segment is a maximum or permutable segment where the formula that occurs in the
segment is of the form a : ♦c. The degree of a segment is the degree of the formula that
occurs in the segment.
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first-order logic given in [13].
Lemma 10. Any derivation π can be rewritten to a derivation π ′ that does not contain
permutable formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas, by repeated applications of
permutative reductions applied to permutable formulas and proper reductions applied to
non-stubborn maximum formulas.
Proof. To any derivation π we assign the pair (d, k) of non-negative integers where d
is the maximal degree of a permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment in π or 0 if
there is no such segment and k is the sum of the lengths of permutable and non-stubborn
maximum segments in π of degree d (note that a list of formula occurrences with only
one element is a segment if the one and only formula occurrence in the list is a maximum
formula). The proof is by induction on such pairs equipped with the lexicographic order.
Let π be a derivation to which a pair (d, k) is assigned such that d > 0. It is straightforward
to check that there exists a permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment σ of degree d in
π such that there is i) no permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment with degree d that
stands above σ and ii) no permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment with degree d
that stands above or contains a minor, relational, or parametric premise of the rule instance
of which the last formula occurrence in σ is the major premise. Let π ′ be the derivation
obtained by applying the appropriate reduction rule such that the last formula occurrence
in σ is removed. Then it is straightforward to check that the pair (d ′, k′) assigned to π ′ is
less than (d, k) in the lexicographic order. 
We are now ready to prove the normalization theorem.
Theorem 11 (Normalization). Any derivation can be rewritten to a normal derivation by
repeated applications of proper and permutative reductions.
Proof. By Lemma 10 we just need to consider derivations that do not contain permutable
formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas. To any such derivation π we assign the non-
negative integer d where d is the maximal stubbornness of a stubborn maximum formula in
π or 0 if there is no stubborn maximum formula. Let π be a derivation to which an integer
d is assigned such that d > 0. It is straightforward that there exists a stubborn maximum
formula A with stubbornness d such that no formula occurrence above A is a stubborn
maximum formula with stubbornness d . Let π ′ be the derivation obtained by applying the
reduction such that A is removed. Then by inspecting the involved reduction rule it is triv-
ial to check that all maximum or permutable formulas in π ′ are stubborn, and moreover, by
Lemma 8 all stubborn maximum formulas in π ′ have stubbornness less than or equal to d
and all stubborn permutable formulas in π ′ have stubbornness less than d , and furthermore,
the number of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π ′ is less than the num-
ber of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π . By repeated applications of
this procedure a derivation is obtained in which all maximum or permutable formulas are
stubborn with stubbornness less than d . By application of Lemma 10 a derivation π ′′ is
obtained that does not contain permutable formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas.
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less than d , then it is trivial to check by inspecting the involved reduction rules that all
maximum or permutable formulas in the derivation τ ′ obtained by applying a permutative
reduction are stubborn, and moreover, it can be proved in a way similar to the way in which
Lemma 8 is proved, that all stubborn formulas in τ ′ have stubbornness less than d . Thus,
all maximum formulas in π ′′ are stubborn with stubbornness less than d . We are therefore
done by induction. 
4.4. The form of normal derivations
Below we adapt an important definition from [13] to intuitionistic hybrid logic.
Definition 12. A path in a derivation π is a non-empty list A1, . . . ,An of formula occur-
rences in π with the following properties.
(1) A1 is a relational conclusion, or the conclusion of a (RG) rule with zero parametric
premises, or an assumption that is not non-relationally discharged by an instance of
(∨E) or (♦E).
(2) For each i < n, Ai is not a minor or relational premise and either
(a) Ai is not the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) and Ai stands imme-
diately above Ai+1, or
(b) Ai is the major premise of an instance r of (∨E) or (♦E) and Ai+1 is an assump-
tion non-relationally discharged by r .
(3) An is either the end-formula of π , or a minor or relational premise, or the major
premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) that does not non-relationally discharge any
assumptions.
Note that A1 in the definition above might be a discharged assumption.
Lemma 13. Any formula occurrence in a derivation π belongs to some path in π .
Proof. Induction on the structure of π . 
The definition of a path leads us to the lemma below. The lemma says that a path in
a normal derivation can be split up into three parts: An analytical part in which formulas
are broken down in their components by successive applications of the elimination rules,
a minimum part in which an instance of the rule (⊥E) may occur, and a synthetical part
in which formulas are put together by successive applications of the introduction rules.
See [14].
Lemma 14. Let β = A1, . . . ,An be a path in a normal derivation. Then there exists a
formula occurrence Ai in β , called the minimum formula in β , such that
(1) for each j < i, Aj is a major or parametric premise or the non-relational premise of
an instance of (Nom1);
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an instance of (⊥E); and
(3) for each j , where i < j < n, Aj is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule, a
parametric premise, or the non-relational premise of an instance of (Nom1).
Proof. Let Ai be the first formula occurrence in β which is not the non-relational premise
of an instance of (Nom1), and is not a parametric premise, and is not the major premise
of an elimination rule save possibly the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E)
that does not non-relationally discharge any assumptions (such a formula occurrence ex-
ists in β as An satisfies the mentioned criteria). We are done if i = n. Otherwise Ai is a
non-relational premise of an introduction rule or the premise of an instance of (⊥E) (by
inspection of the rules and the definition of a path). If Ai is the premise of an instance
of (⊥E), then each Aj , where i < j < n, is a non-relational premise of an introduction
rule, or the non-relational premise of an instance of (Nom1), or a parametric premise (by
inspection of the rules, the definition of a branch, and normality of π ). Similarly, if Ai
is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule, then each Aj , where i < j < n, is a
non-relational premise of an introduction rule or a parametric premise. 
In what follows we shall consider the form of normal derivations. To this end we give
the following definition.
Definition 15. The notion of a subformula is defined by the conventions that
• A is a subformula of A;
• if B ∧C, B ∨C, or B → C is a subformula of A, then so are B and C; and
• if a : B , ♦B , or B is a subformula of A, then so is B .
A formula a : A is a quasi-subformula of a formula c : B if and only if A is a subformula
of B .
Now we state the theorem which says that normal derivations satisfy a version of the
subformula property.
Theorem 16 (Quasi-subformula property). Let π be a normal derivation of A from a set
of satisfaction statements Γ . Any formula occurrence C in π is a quasi-subformula of A,
or of some satisfaction statement in Γ , or of some relational premise, or of some relational
conclusion, or of some relationally discharged assumption.
Proof. First a convention: The order of a path in π is the number of formula occurrences
in π which stand below the last formula occurrence of the path. Now consider a path
β = A1, . . . ,An in π of order p. By induction we can assume that the theorem holds for
all formula occurrences in paths of order less than p. Note that it follows from Lemma 14
that any formula occurrence Aj such that j  i, where Ai minimum formula in β , is a
quasi-subformula of A1, and similarly, any Aj such that j > i is a quasi-subformula of An.
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If An is the minor premise of an instance of (→ E), then we are done by induction as
the major premise belongs to a path of order less than p. If An is the major premise of an
instance of (∨E) or (♦E) that does not non-relationally discharge any assumptions, then
An is the minimum formula and hence a quasi-subformula of A1. Now, we are done if
A1 is a relational conclusion, or an undischarged assumption, or a relationally discharged
assumption. Otherwise A1 is discharged by an instance of (→ I ) with a conclusion that
belongs to some branch of order less than p (note that due to normality of π , A1 is not the
conclusion of a (RG) rule with zero parametric premises).
We now consider A1. We are done if A1 is a relational conclusion, or an undischarged
assumption, or a relationally discharged assumption. If A1 is the conclusion of a (RG) rule
with zero parametric premises, then A1 has the same form as the minimum formula which
is a quasi-subformula of An. Otherwise A1 is discharged by an instance of (→ I ) with a
conclusion that belongs to β or to some path of order less than p. 
Note that it is a consequence of the theorem that C is a quasi-subformula of A, or of
some formula in Γ , or of a formula of the form a : c or a : ♦c (since relational premises,
relational conclusions, and relationally discharged assumptions are of the form a : c or
a : ♦c).
5. Soundness and completeness
Having given the Kripke semantics and the natural deduction system, we are now ready
to prove soundness and completeness. Recall that we are working with a fixed basic geo-
metric theory T. A modelM is called a T-model if and only ifM |= C for every formula
C in T (note that the modelM in this definition is considered a first-order model as C is a
first-order formula).
Theorem 17 (Soundness). Let B be a satisfaction statement and let Γ be a set of satisfac-
tion statements. The first claim below implies the second claim.
(1) B is derivable from Γ in NIHL + T.
(2) For any T-modelM, any element w of W , and any w-assignment g, if, for any formula
C ∈ Γ ,M, g,w |= C, thenM, g,w |= B .
Proof. Induction on the structure of the derivation of B where we make use of Proposi-
tion 3. 
In what follows, we shall give a Henkin-type proof of completeness. In the interest of
simplicity, we shall often omit reference to the basic geometric theory T and to the natural
deduction system NIHL + T.
Definition 18. A set of satisfaction statements Γ is inconsistent if and only if a : ⊥ is deriv-
able from Γ for some nominal a and Γ is consistent if and only if Γ is not inconsistent.
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logical formulas built using the nominals in C. Moreover, let C0 denote the set of nominals
in the language defined earlier in this paper, thus, L(C0) denotes the language we have
considered hitherto.
Definition 19. Let C and E be disjoint countably infinite sets of nominals. A set of satis-
faction statements Γ in the language L(C ∪ E) is E-saturated if and only if
(1) Γ is consistent;
(2) if A is derivable from Γ , then A ∈ Γ ;
(3) if a : (A∨B) ∈ Γ , then a : A ∈ Γ or a : B ∈ Γ ;
(4) if a : ♦A ∈ Γ , then for some nominal e in E, e : A ∈ Γ and a : ♦e ∈ Γ ; and
(5) if e : (s1 ∧ · · · ∧ sn)[d¯/a¯] ∈ Γ for some formula ∀a¯((S1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sn) → ∃c¯∨mj=1(Sj1 ∧
· · · ∧ Sjnj )) in T where m 1, then for some list b¯ of nominals in E, e :
∨m
j=1(sj1 ∧
· · · ∧ sjnj )[d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯] ∈ Γ .
We are now ready for a saturation lemma.
Lemma 20 (Saturation lemma). Let C and E be disjoint countably infinite sets of nominals
and let A1, A2, A3, . . . be an enumeration of all satisfaction statements in L(C ∪ E). Let
Γ be a set of satisfaction statements in L(C) and let B be a satisfaction statement in L(C)
such that B is not derivable from Γ . An E-saturated set of satisfaction statements Γ ∗ ⊇ Γ
from which B is not derivable is defined as follows. Firstly, Γ 0 is defined to be Γ . Secondly,
Γ n+1 is defined by induction. If B is derivable from Γ n ∪ {An+1}, then Γ n+1 is defined to
be Γ n. Otherwise Γ n+1 is defined to be
(1) Γ n ∪ {An+1, a : C} if An+1 is of the form a : (C ∨ E) and B is not derivable from
Γ n ∪ {An+1, a : C};
(2) Γ n ∪ {An+1, a : E} if An+1 is of the form a : (C ∨ E) and the first clause does not
apply;
(3) Γ n ∪ {An+1, e : C,a : ♦e} if An+1 is of the form a : ♦C;
(4) Γ n ∪ {An+1, e :∨mj=1(sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ sjnj )[d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯]} if there exists a formula in T of the
form ∀a¯((S1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sn) → ∃c¯∨mj=1(Sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sjnj )) such that m 1 and An+1 =
e : (s1 ∧ · · · ∧ sn)[d¯/a¯] for some nominal e and some list d¯ of nominals; and
(5) Γ n ∪ {An+1} if none of the first four clauses apply.
In clause 3, e is a nominal in E that does not occur in Γ n or An+1, and similarly, in
clause 4, b¯ is a list of nominals in E such that none of the nominals in b occur in Γ n or
An+1. Finally, Γ ∗ is defined to be
⋃
n0 Γ
n
.
Proof. Firstly, B is not derivable from Γ 0 by definition. Secondly, to check that the non-
derivability of B from Γ n implies the non-derivability of B from Γ n+1, we need to check
each of the clauses in the definition of Γ n+1. The first and fifth clauses are trivial. For the
second clause, the derivability of B from Γ n ∪ {An+1, a : E} implies the derivability of
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from Γ n ∪ {An+1} by the rule (∨E). For the third clause, the derivability of B from Γ n ∪
{An+1, e : C,a : ♦e} implies the derivability of B from Γ n ∪{An+1} by the rule (♦E). The
fourth clause is analogous to the third clause. We conclude that B is not derivable from Γ ∗.
It is straightforward to check that Γ ∗ is E-saturated. 
The canonical model given below is similar to a canonical model for first-order intu-
itionistic logic given in [18].
Definition 21 (Canonical model). Let C1, C2, C3, . . . be pairwise disjoint countably infinite
sets of nominals disjoint from C0 and let C∗n =
⋃
1in Ci where n  1. Let Γ be a
consistent set of satisfaction statements in the language L(C0). A model
MΓ = (WΓ ,⊆, {DΓw }w∈WΓ , {∼Γw }w∈WΓ , {RΓw }w∈WΓ , {V Γw }w∈WΓ )
and for each w ∈ WΓ , a w-assignment gΓw , are defined as follows.
• WΓ = {Δ ⊇ Γ | for some n, Δ ⊆ L(C0 ∪ C∗n) and Δ is C∗n-saturated}.
• DΓΔ = C0 ∪ C∗n where Δ is C∗n-saturated.• a ∼ΓΔ c if and only if a : c ∈ Δ.
• aRΓΔc if and only if a : ♦c ∈ Δ.
• V ΓΔ (p) = {a | a : p ∈ Δ}.
• gΓΔ(a) = a where a ∈ DΓΔ .
Note that it follows from Lemma 20 that WΓ is non-empty. It is straightforward to
check the other requirements MΓ has to satisfy to be a model for intuitionistic hybrid
logic. Given the saturation lemma and the definition of a canonical model, we are ready to
prove a truth lemma.
Lemma 22 (Truth lemma). For any Δ ∈ WΓ and any satisfaction statement a : A in
L(DΓΔ), a : A ∈ Δ if and only ifMΓ , gΓΔ,Δ,a |= A.
Proof. Induction on the degree of A. We only consider the case where A is of the form
C; the other cases are simpler.
Assume that a : C ∈ Δ. Let Λ ⊇ Δ and aRΓΛe, that is, a : ♦e ∈ Λ. Then e : C ∈ Λ
by the rule (E) which by the induction hypothesis implies that MΓ , gΓΛ,Λ, e |= C. It
follows thatMΓ , gΓΔ,Δ,a |=C.
Assume that a :C /∈ Δ. Assume that Δ is C∗n-saturated and let e ∈ C∗n+1. Then e : C
is not derivable from Δ ∪ {a : ♦e} for otherwise we could derive a : C from Δ by the
rule (I ). According to Lemma 20, there exists a C∗n+2-saturated extension Λ of Δ ∪{a : ♦e} such that e : C is not derivable from Λ. It follows by the induction hypothesis that
MΓ , gΓΛ,Λ, e |= C is not the case. This contradictsMΓ , gΓΔ,Δ,a |=C since a : ♦e ∈ Λ
implies that aRΓΛe. 
We only need one more lemma before we can prove completeness.
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MΓ is a T-model.
Proof. Let G ∈ T. Then G has the form ∀a¯((S1 ∧ · · · ∧Sn) → ∃c¯∨mj=1(Sj1 ∧ · · · ∧Sjnj ))
where a¯ = a1, . . . , al . Assume that Δ is an element of WΓ and g is a Δ-assignment for
MΓ such thatMΓ ,Δ |= S1[g], . . . ,MΓ ,Δ |= Sn[g]. (Note thatMΓ is considered a model
for intuitionistic first-order logic.) So g(a1) = d1, . . . , g(al) = dl for some nominals d1,
. . . , dl in DΓΔ . Then s1[d¯/a¯], . . . , sn[d¯/a¯] ∈ Δ by the definition of a canonical model. If
m  1, then it follows from Δ being saturated that there exists a list of nominals b¯ such
that e :∨mj=1(sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ sjnj )[d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯] ∈ Δ where e is an arbitrary nominal. Therefore
e : (sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ sjnj )[d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯] ∈ Δ and hence sj1[d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯], . . . , sjnj [d¯, b¯/a¯, c¯] ∈ Δ for
some j where 1 j m. But then it follows from the definition of a canonical model that
MΓ ,Δ |= ∃c¯∨mj=1(Sj1 ∧ · · · ∧ Sjnj )[g]. On the other hand, if m = 0, then e : ⊥ ∈ Δ by
the rule (RG) which contradicts the consistency of Δ. 
Now the completeness theorem.
Theorem 24 (Completeness). Let B be a satisfaction statement and let Γ be a set of satis-
faction statements. The second claim below implies the first claim.
(1) B is derivable from Γ in NIHL + T.
(2) For any T-modelM, any element w of W , and any w-assignment g, if, for any formula
C ∈ Γ ,M, g,w |= C, thenM, g,w |= B .
Proof. Assume that B is not derivable from Γ . Consider the canonical model MΓ and
let Λ be a C∗1 saturated extension of Γ from which B is not derivable, cf. Lemma 20.
It follows from Lemma 22 that MΓ , gΓΛ,Λ |= B is not the case but it also follows from
Lemma 22 that for any C ∈ Γ ,MΓ , gΓΛ,Λ |= C is the case. But this contradicts the second
statement in the theorem sinceMΓ is a T-model by Lemma 23. 
6. Conclusions and further work
We have shown that constructivity and hybridness of logics are orthogonal concerns, at
least to the extent that there is a logic, which we called IHL that is both hybrid and con-
structive. We also provided a natural deduction formulation NIHL for this logic. The system
NIHL is based on Simpson’s natural deduction formulation of constructive modal logic and
we have shown that our hybrid version shares with it several good properties: The system
is normalizing and satisfies a version of the subformula property. Hybridizing Simpson’s
system is not trivial, see below. Moreover, our system can be extended with inference rules
corresponding to geometric first-order conditions on the accessibility relation, as can Simp-
son’s. The possible-worlds semantics (based on Ewald’s work) is sound and complete for
NIHL.
In the case of ordinary first-order logic, applying a reduction to a maximum formula
only generates new maximum formulas having a lower degree than the original one. In
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this property. The natural deduction system given in the present paper does not have this
property since the reduction rules for  and ♦ might generate new maximum formulas of
the form a : ♦e, that is, maximum formulas that do not necessarily have a lower degree than
the original one (here we ignore permutable formulas). Thus, the standard technique used
in the normalization proof does not work directly for our case. In this paper the problem is
solved by using the so-called ♦-graph of a derivation which keeps track of such maximum
formulas. The notion of a ♦-graph is similar to a notion introduced in [5] to solve the same
kind of problem for classical hybrid logic. We have not seen such a notion elsewhere.
We reiterate that, although the proofs are reasonably straightforward, the results are
important as they confirm the presupposition in hybrid logic that it is the process of hy-
bridization that is central. Our work confirms that the process is at least to some extent
independent of the basic logic considered. Thus our system provides some evidence of the
naturalness of the hybridization process.
Concerning further work we would like to investigate whether we can adapt the “non-
situated” version of natural deduction for hybrid logics, based on Seligman’s work [6,15],
to a constructive formulation. We would also like to consider an alternative version of basic
modal logic [2] as a basis for a constructive hybrid logic. Finally we need to investigate
the suitability of (all?) the logics just mentioned to the problem of modelling contexts in
knowledge representation formalisms devised to deal with natural language semantics.
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